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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE Appellant was
indicted under a Georgia statute 1 which provided that anyone who contracted
to perform services of any kind with the intent not to perform such services

1

Ga. Code (1936), tit. 26, § 7408.

1942}

RECENT DECISIONS

was subject, upon conviction, to fine and /or imprisonment. 2 • Proof of the
contract, procurement of money or any other thing of value, and the failure
to perform the service or to return the money advanced without good and sufficient cause were stated to be presumptive evidence of the requisite intent. 8
Appellant claimed that the statute violated the Thirteenth Amendment and the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state court held the act
was not illegal since it provided punishment only for fraud.-.1 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court held that, since the presumptive evidence clause
permitted the jury to convict on proof of the contract, breach, and failure to
return the advancement, or to perform, without a good and sufficient cause, the
threat of punishment resulted in involuntary servitude repugnant to the Thirteenth Amendment. 6 Taylor 'U. Georgia, 315. U.S. 25, 62 S. Ct. 415 (1942).
It was early decided that the term "involuntary servitudi::_" as used in the
Thirteenth Amendment applies not alone to slavery, but to any form of compulsory personal servitude,6 and that Congress has the right to enforce the
amendment by direct legislation prohibiting peonage. 7 The amendment does not
prohibit those services which prior to its passage had always been treated as
exceptional,8 but it does prohibit involuntary servitude even though such may
have originated pursuant to a voluntary contract.8 In the principal case it was

Ga. Code (1936), tit. z7, § z506.
Ga. Code (1936), tit. z6, § 7409.
4 Taylor v. State, 191 Ga. 682, 13 S. E. (2d) 647 (1941).
6 lt was also held that the statutes violated the Act of 1867 prohibiting peonage,
8 U.S. C. (1940), § 56 and 18 U. S. C. (1940), § 444. The Fourteenth Amendment was not considered.
6 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 at 69 (1872); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883). That "personal" service is necessary for involuntary servitude, see Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 41 S. Ct.
465 (1920).
7 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, z5 S. Ct. 4z9 (1904). For background
material on peonage, s,ee Peonage Cases, (D. C. Ala. 1903) 1z3 F. 671; Peonage
Cases, (D. C. Ark. 1905) 136 F. 707.
8 Examples of exceptions include the following. Sef'rlice of sailors: Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U. S. z75, 17 S. Ct. 326 (1896); but see Elman v. Moller, (C. C. A.
4th, 1926) II F. (2d) 55, where it was held there is no exception when the ship
is in port. Work on pubUc roads: Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328, 36 S, Ct. z58
(1915); In re Dassler, 35 Kan. 678, 12 P. 130 (1886); Dennis v. Simon, 51 Ohio
St. z23, 36 N. E. 83z (1894), Compulsory military seroice: Selective Draft Law
Cases, z45 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159 (1918); United States v. Lambert, (C. C. A.
3d, 1941) IZ3 F. (zd) 395. Enforcement of labor for reasons of national defense:
State v. McClure, 7 Boyce (30 Del.) z65, 105 A. 71z (1919); contra, Ex parte
Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 5z6, 103 S. E. 327 (1920); see Keefer, "Has a Person The
Constitutional Right to Abstain From Work," 29 W. VA. L. Q. 20 (1922). Training
schools for minors: Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, II8 So. 184 (1928); Gamer v.
Wood, 188 Ga. 463, 4 S. E. (2d) 137 (1939). Payment of alimony: Clark v. Clark,
152 Tenn. 431, 278 S. W. 65 (1925).
9 Ex parte Lloyd, (D. C. Ky. 1936) 13 F. Supp. 1005 (agreement to take a
narcotic cure); State ex rel. Hobbs v. Murrell, 170 Tenn, 152, 93 S. W. (2d) 628
(1936) (agreement to work out costs if nolle proseque entered).
2
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argued that the Georgia statute merely provided punishment for the act of
defrauding the employer and therefore it came within the constitutional exception allowing "punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted."·10 The court, in reaching a contrary conclusion, relied on' the reasoning of Bailey v. Alabama 11 in which a similar statute was invalidated.12 In
both cases the fundamental purpose was held to be an attempt to achieve by indirection through the use of the prima facie clause, permitting criminal conviction
after proof of breach of the contract without cause and a refusal to return the
advancements, what could not be achieved by direct means. The Court in each
case was of the opinion that the laborers' fear of criminal conviction would result
in coerced compliance with the terms of the contract, which in effect 'would be
involuntary servitude. The state could not under the guise of the police power
limit constitutional guarantees.13 Justice Holmes in the Bailey case dissented on
the ground that the statute only punished fraud, but he stated that even if the
provisions went further, the constitution did not restrict the power of the state
to make the breach of a fair and proper contract a criminal act. According to
Holmes the threat of punishment would only intensify the desire to perform a
legal obligation, and imprisonment would not make the laborer a slave. Subsequent cases pave not accepted this view,14 and Justice Holmes partially modified
it in a later concurring opinion.15 The principal case is in accord with previous
decisions of the present Court protecting civil liberties.
John W. Potter

U.S. Const., 13th amend., § I.
219 U.S. 219, 31 S. Ct. 145 (1910), noted 24 HARv. L. REv. 391 (1911);
II CoL. L. REv. 363 (1911).
12 Under the Alabama law the accused was not permitted to testify as to his intention, while under the Georgia statutes he could make an unsworn statement. The court
held the distinction was not significant.
18 For other decisions on the same subject holding that the use of the police power
to enforce compulsory service by threat of punishment is a violation of organic law,
see Ex parte Drayton, (D. C. S., C. 1907) 153 F. 986; Ex parte Hollman, 79 S. C.
9, 60 S. E. 19 (1908); Fenner v. Boykin, (D. C. Ga. 1925) 3 F. (2d) 674. See
also Stevens, "Involuntary Servitude by Injunction," 6 CoRN. L. Q. 235 (1921).
14 State v. Armstead, 103 Miss. 790, 60 So. 778 (1913); Goode v. Nelson, 73
Fla. 29, 74 So. 17 (19r7); State v. Oliva, 144 La. 51, 80 So. 195 (1918).
15 United States v. Reynolds, 235 U. S. 133, 35
Ct. 86 (1914). Justice
Holmes reiterated his contention there there was nothing in the Thirteenth Amendment that prevented a state from making a breach of contract a crime, but said the
statute involved was designed to enforce compulsory service.
10
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